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THE PROTEAN PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY: HOW DIFFERENT IS 
PROPORTIONALITY IN EU CONTEXTS?  
 
 
Subject: Proportionality. Other related subjects: Administrative law.  
 
Keywords: Accreditation; EU law; Judicial review; Manifest Disproportionality; 
Proportionality; Quality assurance; Wednesbury unreasonableness. 
 
Legislation: Regulation 14, Provision of Service Regulations 2009 (SI 2999/2009); 
Directive 2006/123/EC 
 
Case: R (on the application of Lumsdon and others) v Legal Services Board [2015] 
UKSC 41; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 121 
 
The Legal Services Board, tasked with the supervision of approved regulators of 
persons carrying on legal activities, granted an application (by the Bar Standards 
Board, Solicitors Regulation Authority, and ILEX Professional Standards Board) for 
approval of alterations to their regulatory arrangements  to give effect to the so-called 
Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (‘the decision’). The Scheme provides for 
judicial assessment of criminal advocates in England and Wales: only those deemed 
‘competent’ would gain full accreditation for upper levels of criminal work. Judicial 
review had been sought, unsuccessfully in the courts below, by barristers practising 
criminal law. The question in R (on the application of Lumsdon and others) v Legal 
Services Board [2015] UKSC 41; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 121 was whether the decision was 
contrary to Regulation 14 of the Provision of Service Regulations 2009 (SI 
2999/2009), which implemented Directive 2006/123/EC (O.J. No. L 376, p. 36). 
Regulation 14 requires that any authorisation scheme cannot be set unless, inter alia, 
the need for such a scheme is ‘justified by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest’ and the scheme’s objective ‘cannot be attained by means of a less restrictive 
measure’ (see Regulation 14(2)).   
The appellants submitted that Regulation 14(2) required the Court to assess 
the proportionality of the Scheme itself, and that the Court of Appeal had been wrong 
to assess only whether the decision to approve the scheme was ‘manifestly 
inappropriate’.  
In a judgment given jointly by Lord Reed and Lord Toulson, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal. In the Court’s view, the issue was whether the legitimate 
and important objectives of protecting recipients of legal services – and the sound 
administration of justice – could justify the Scheme in the way it had been approved. 
Simply put, could the objectives be attained through reliance on a less restrictive 
measure? In this connection the Court reviewed, in hitherto unseen detail, the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the principle of 
proportionality.  
The Court found that the courts below had erred in taking the view that the 
correct test was whether the Board’s judgment had been ‘manifestly wrong’ and that 
it was not for the courts themselves to decide (at [103]); instead, the Court held, it is 
for the court itself to decide whether the scheme is proportionate (at [101]). Whilst, 
on the one hand, the Scheme placed a burden on all those affected by it, on the other, 
the potential consequences of poor advocacy were serious and the scheme was to be 
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reviewed after two years. Whether such a high level of protection could acceptably be 
provided was exactly the sort of question in respect of which national authorities are, 
under EU law, allowed a margin of appreciation. Thus, the Court held, the Board had 
not gone beyond its margin of discretion by determining that the level of risk 
presented by possible less restrictive measures made them unacceptable. The only 
way of providing the desired level of protection was to have a comprehensive 
assessment scheme; it followed, therefore, that such a scheme was proportionate to 
the aims sought achieved.  
 Lumsdon is the most important judgment to date regarding the meaning and 
application of the principle of proportionality by the domestic courts in EU law 
contexts. Its impact is likely to be felt beyond the EU context, however. Three 
observations are particularly pertinent.  
 First, Lord Reed and Lord Toulson stated that the principle of proportionality 
in EU law contexts differs from the principle of proportionality under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As regards the EU law test, proportionality involves 
two, possibly three, questions (at [33]): (a) whether the measure in question is suitable 
or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued; (b) whether it could be attained by a 
less onerous method; and, possibly, (c) whether the burden imposed by the measure is 
disproportionate to the benefits secured. Although there is evident overlap between 
proportionality in fundamental rights cases and in EU law cases, it was held that the 
four stage analysis of proportionality in a fundamental rights context outlined in Bank 
Mellat v H.M. Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] A.C. 700 (at [74]), is not 
applicable to proportionality in EU law. The exact extent of the differences, however, 
was left unexplained (textually only the first stage of the human rights test, relating to 
the measure’s objective, is missing). It is worth remembering that there will, as is the 
case with EU proportionality (witness how sometimes the EU law test will involve 
three stages when it is addressed by the parties; at other times, only two), be instances 
even in the context of fundamental rights where not all four questions of the test in 
Bank Mellat (No. 2) will be posed, or a less intense version (manifestly without 
reasonable foundation) will apply. Much of what the Court says about EU 
proportionality thus applies mutatis mutandis to proportionality in other contexts too. 
Secondly, the effect of the judgment is to confirm that the principle of 
proportionality is not a monolithic standard: its application ‘depends to a significant 
extent on the context’ (at [23]). In the EU field, the Court explained, whilst it is 
‘important to avoid an excessively schematic approach’ (at [34]), there are at least 
three different contexts and versions of the test:  
(a) the review of EU measures (at [40]–[49]) – here the reviewing 
court (the CJEU, as a national court cannot declare such measures 
invalid: C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost 
ECLI:EU:C:1987:452) should usually intervene only if it considers that 
the measure adopted by the legislature is ‘manifestly inappropriate’, 
thus effectively dropping the “least onerous” limb (at [42]);  
(b) the review of national measures relying on derogations from 
general EU rights (at [50]–[72]) – if a fundamental freedom is at issue, 
the test will normally be an exigent one, whereas if no such right is 
involved, the courts will afford a greater margin of discretion to the 
decision-maker;  
(c) the review of national measures implementing EU law (at [73]–
[74]) – if political, economic or social discretion is involved, the court 
will normally apply a test of ‘manifest disproportionality’, whereas if a 
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fundamental freedom is involved, the test will normally be an exigent 
one. 
 One is left with the impression that the principle of proportionality has taken 
on a distinctly protean nature. There is a multitude of different versions of ‘the’ 
proportionality test which the domestic courts are now expected to apply. To give but 
a few examples: ‘normal’ two stage EU proportionality, ‘normal’ three-stage EU 
proportionality, EU manifest disproportionality, ‘normal’ four-stage ECHR 
proportionality, ECHR manifestly without reasonable foundation, and, arguably, 
‘proportionality at common law’ in connection with common law rights.  
There are undoubted advantages of the courts adopting a (less intense) version 
of proportionality review outside the fundamental rights context (A.C.L Davies & J.R. 
Williams, ‘Proportionality in English Law’ in The Judge and the Proportionate Use 
of Discretion (Ranchordas & de Waard) (2015), 89–95). Nevertheless, a number of 
cautions should be noted. First, the sheer multitude of different versions of 
proportionality from which a court must choose leads potentially to doctrinal 
confusion rather than the hoped-for simplicity of having proportionality as the general 
standard of review: reasonableness review was itself criticised for having many 
guises, which is a recipe for inconsistency. It is important that the danger against 
which Lord Slynn warned in R (Alconbury Developments Ltd.) v Secretary of State 
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 A.C. 295 
at [51], that retention of rationality review alongside proportionality could be 
‘unnecessary and confusing’, should be avoided in relation to the diverse 
proportionality tests too. Secondly, in choosing between the versions, any court 
necessarily has to front-load much of its analysis. On the one hand, this could lead to 
overly-simplistic compartmentalisation of categories of case with overtones of the 
issues related to ‘spatial’ conceptions of deference (by creating zones of decision 
making within which review does not, in practice, lie). On the other hand, it could 
produce a risk of double counting deference factors (e.g. constitutional, institutional, 
and democratic): the court will have to consider the context to decide on a ‘lower’ 
initial standard, and then may duplicate the same concepts in exercising discretion 
when applying that test. Thirdly, it is equally important not to mask those 
conceptually-distinct deference factors by ‘sweeping them up’ in the initial analysis, 
thus jeopardising the structural clarity of proportionality.  
Finally, Lord Kerr has recently questioned whether proportionality at common 
law can apply outside of a rights context (Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1665 at [281]). The 
application by the Supreme Court of a proportionality inquiry into the non-traditional 
rights issues in Lumsdon provides an example of how the principle of proportionality 
can apply to non-rights situations. Why could not the same be the case at common 
law? Kant said of the French Revolution that more important than the Revolution 
itself was the fact of its having happened; its importance lay in what it potentially 
pointed towards (Political Writings, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1991, p. 182). It might, at 
some peril of portentousness, be thought that Lumsdon should be read in the same 
light. The nice distinction the Court makes as between EU and ECHR proportionality 
may succeed or it may fail. The real importance of Lumsdon is the simple fact that it – 
a proportionality case on a non-rights issue – was analysed in so much detail and the 
future direction in which it points: the replacement of rationality review by one 
variable, context-dependent principle of proportionality. This is a positive 
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